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GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
The nation that is best equipped with powerful cannons and fast
battleships can devour any large portion of territory at will, and
thus all this talk of international law is sheer nonsense.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The treaty port system established by the Treaty of Nanking in 1842
demonstrates the merger of two regional systems of law and constitutes the
formation of modem international law.' Prior to 1842 and the first Opium War
between Great Britain and China, two systems of international law and
relations existed: the Chinese system in Asia and the European system in the
West. The treaty port system with its most-favored-nation clause applied
across a broad, multilateral, and truly global group of states and represents a
new type of legal institution characteristic of models of cooperative gover-
nance found in modem international law.' This Note will discuss the merger
of two regional legal systems into a new system representative of our modem
system of international law.'
In the mid-nineteenth century, Western theories of natural law combined
with existing positive law to form a body of law which applied to relations
between and among Western states. 5 Where non-Western states merited
inclusion in this body of rules, they most often became objects or prizes to be
divided among Western states.6 The law of war and the law of peace existed
THE EUROPEAN DIARY OF HSIEH FUCHENG: ENVOY EXTRAORDINARY OF IMPERIAL CHINA
13 (Helen Hsieh Chien trans., 1993) [hereinafter THE EUROPEAN DIARY OF HSIEH FUCHENG].
Hsieh, ambassador to England, France, and Italy, comments on the Turkish view that Britain
violated Turkey's sovereignty by interfering with its Egyptian colony. Id. at 19.
2 The treaty ended the first Opium War (1839-42) and established the first "unequal treaty"
of the treaty port system, granting one-sided trade rights to Great Britain at China's expense.
Treaty of Nanking, Aug. 29, 1842, China-Gr. Brit., 93 Consol. T.S. 465.
' See generally David Kennedy, International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of
an Illusion, 17 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 99 (1997) (discussing the differences in international law in
the beginning of the nineteenth century versus at the end of the century).
' See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060 (listing the sources of international law the International Court of Justice uses to
resolve disputes); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 (1987) (listing
sources of international law).
See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 112-16 (discussing nineteenth century thinking on natural
law and positive law).
6 Kennedy, supra note 3, at 128-29 (describing natives as "neither refusing civilization nor
part of a different civilization"). See also id. at 124-26 (discussing the lack of an enforcing body
for treaties and the questionable nature of treaty obligations at the beginning of the nineteenth
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as tools of imperialism and diplomacy.' War remained a viable and even legal
means of attaining state goals, and non-Western states had few, if any, rights.'
Determined to force the opening of Asia, Western states found their law of
peace sufficient to the task of maintaining relations between themselves, but
found their law of war too costly in its application to a land so far removed
from Europe.9
While European forces held an advantage sufficient to guarantee conquest,
the commercial advantages gained through such conquest in Asia proved
insufficient to meet the political and economic costs of constant warfare.'0 In
order to maintain advantages gained through gunboat diplomacy, Western
states required a new institution and a new means of maintaining peaceful
order with only occasional applications of force." They found the basic
elements of this institution already in existence in China-the treaty port.'
2
Taking the bilateral treaty port familiar and acceptable to the Chinese, Western
states expanded this solitary institution into a multilateral, living system and
thus participated in the creation of a new type of institution of global
proportions: the treaty port system.' 3
In the mid-nineteenth century China a less formal but similar system of
natural law existed in concert with bilateral treaties. Having consolidated its
holdings on the Asian mainland, China dominated the region both culturally
and materially. Chinese concepts parallel to, but significantly different from,
European natural law effectively represented Asia's ideas, customary practice,
relationships, and treaties.' 4 China faced Western incursion with an array of
century).
' Alfred P. Rubin et al., History ofInternational Law, 82 AM. SOC'Y INT'LL. PROC. 25, 29-
31 (1988).
8 Note that warfare and use of force remained, into the twentieth century, legitimate tools
for use by states enforcing laws or seeking to change their status. See, e.g., SHARON KORMAN,
THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST: THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND PRACTICE 179 (1996).
9 See JOHN KING FAIRBANK, TRADE AND DIPLOMACY ON THE CHINA COAST: THE OPENING
OF THE TREATY PORTS, 1842-1854, at 72-73 (1953).
10 See id. at 72-132.
See id.
2 One example, is the case of Kokand where a similar treaty port was established in 1835.
See JOHN KING FAIRBANK, CHINA: A NEW HISTORY 197-98, 200-01 (1992); infra p. 701-03.
13 Here the distinction is drawn between bilateral treaties and the multitude of treaties
containing most-favored-nation clauses which created a treaty port "system."
14 Examples include Japanese and Korean use of Confucianism and tributary state
relationships.
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traditional institutions and tactics but remained unable militarily to success-
fully resist foreign aggression. 5
Forced by Great Britain to grant a degree of autonomy and control over
trade to a foreign power, the Qing government extended these same rights to
other states through a series of bilateral treaties containing most-favored-nation
clauses.' 6 The bilateral treaty port system thus became the multilateral treaty
port system, inclusive of a wide array of Western states and, eventually, Japan.
While this regime largely contained the foreign presence, it discouraged
competition among foreign powers and led to an ever-expanding foreign
presence in China supported by a combination of treaties connecting the maj or
states of the world and binding their interests together by law and treaty. 7
The novelty of this treaty port system lay in the collective effect of bilateral
treaties containing most-favored-nation provisions. As a native institution
significantly modified and expanded by foreign demand, the treaty port system
satisfied elements of both the Chinese and Western legal traditions.'8 Two
seemingly exclusive universalistic systems merged into a new form that both
could claim and neither could effectively deny authoring. The nineteenth
century treaty port system in China represents a great change in the concept of
international law from a law of coexistence to a law of cooperation and may
be seen as the first truly global institution of its kind whose heirs may include
the League of Nations, the United Nations, and the World Trade Organization.
As the first global regime of cooperative governance, the treaty port system
represents the birth of modern international law.
II. BACKGROUND: MERGER OF Two SYSTEMS
Contrary to traditional accounts depicting China as a passive recipient of
European international law, the West adapted Chinese legal forms and
institutions, such as the treaty port, to form modern international law. The
traditional account of China's nineteenth century contact with European states
and America describes the Western introduction of international law to
" See generally FAIRBANK, supra note 12.
16 See, e.g., Treaty of Peace, Amity and Commerce, July 3, 1844, U.S.-China, 8 Stat. 592
[hereinafter Treaty of Wanghsia] (granting the United States rights similar to Great Britain).
" Eighteen states held treaty rights prior to World War I. Philip R. Abbey, Treaty Ports &
Extraterritoriality in 1920s China, Apr. 9, 2005, at http://www.geocities.com/treatyportOl/
TREATY01 .html.
"S See, FAIRBANK, supra note 9, at 439.
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China.19 In this view, Imperial China merely accepted Western trade demands
and the introduction of concepts of international law by modem Western
nation-states. 21 China's initial response took the form of refusal based either
in xenophobia or a sense of cultural superiority21 until the West used gunboat
diplomacy to pry open the gates to Chinese markets.22
Gunboat diplomacy first established a British treaty port at Guangzhou in
1842.23 Scholars hail this moment as the beginning of the end for the Chinese
tributary state system and the introduction of Western international legal
institutions. 24  The term "treaty port," however, is as much an English
translation of a Chinese institution as is the term "Son of Heaven" or "Middle
Kingdom," and holds only the same sort of approximate meaning as any
translation. "Treaty port" simply describes in Western terms a Chinese
institution that already existed-a means China used to deal with intransigent
barbarians who failed to understand or grasp the tributary state system.25 The
treaty port system in China constituted a new legal institution which reflected
the traditions of both East and West meeting in a context new to both.
"9 See, e.g., Onuma Yasuaki, The Birth of International Law as the Law of International
Society, 94 AM. SOC'Y INT'LL. PROC. 44(2000). "One example is the prevailing expression of
'admission of Turkey, China etc., to international society.'" Id.
21 Ssu-Yu TENG & JOHN K. FAIRBANK, CHINA'S RESPONSE TO THE WEST: A DOCUMENTARY
SURVEY, 1839-1923, at 163 (1979).
21 Li Zhoajie, Legacy of Modern Chinese History: Its Relevance to the Chinese Perspective
of the Contemporary International Legal Order, 5 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 314, 314-18
(2001).
22 William P. Alford, Law, Law, What Law? Why Western Scholars of China Have Not Had
More to Say About Its Law, in THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 45, 51 (Karen G.
Turner et al. eds., 2000).
23 The Opium War ended with the Treaty of Nanking which ended the previous cohong
system and instituted the treaty port system. See Treaty of Nanking, supra note 2.
24 See, e.g., W.G. BEASLEY, JAPANESE IMPERIALISM, 1894-1945, 41-48 (1987). Part of the
problem with this view is treating the tribute system as China's singular trade institution or
foreign policy when, in fact, China instituted a variety of strategies of "barbarian management"
including wall building, the tribute system, the cohong system, and the treaty port system. See,
e.g., ARTHUR WALDRON, THE GREAT WALL OF CHINA 171-73 (1990) (discussing Ming wall
building and tribute system strategies among foreign policy alternatives).
25 The case of Kokand, where a treaty port was established in 1835, is an example. See
FAIRBANK, supra note 12, at 197-98, 200-01; PETER WARD FAY, THE OPIUM WAR 1840-1842,
at 29-40 (1975); infra p. 18. See generally JAMES L. HEVIA, CHERISHING MEN FROM AFAR: QING
GUESTRTUALANDTHEMACARTNEY EMBASSY OF 1793 (1995) (explaining the apparent Western
failure to grasp the tribute system); GEORGE MACARTNEY, AN EMBASSY TO CHINA: BEING THE
JOURNAL KEPT BY LORD MACARTNEY DURING HIS EMBASSY TO THE EMPEROR CH'IEN-LUNG,
1793-1794 (1950).
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At least initially, the treaty port system reflected a means previously used
by the Qing government to assuage barbarians demanding trade concessions
and offering a credible armed threat. 6 As time went on, the introduction of
other nations into a regime of bilateral treaties containing most-favored nation
clauses27 created an institution characteristic of developing international law
rather than a child of either the European or Chinese contexts alone.2" The
creation of the treaty port system in China represented not the Chinese
adoption of Western international law, but rather the Western adaptation of an
existing Chinese legal institution and the birth of modern international law.29
The West did not introduce the concept of a treaty port to China; it seized upon
the existing institution and altered it through a series of treaties into a
multilateral regime, which constituted a new legal institution
altogether-perhaps born Chinese but raised to maturity by cooperative
effort.30
Scholars view customary practices and treaties among China and Asian
states as elements of Chinese domestic law3 rather than international law since
26 See FAIRBANK, supra note 12; see also R. Randle Edwards, Imperial China's Control
Law, I J. CHINESE L. 33, 33-34 (1987) (remarking that the record "reveals a complex mixture
of rules and practices, some reflecting the hierarchal presuppositions of the tribute model, others
representing ad hoc working compromises between China and other countries").
27 The most-favored-nation clause found Chinese support in traditional concepts of treating
all barbarians equally and Western support in competitive but informal empire-building goals.
See FAIRBANK, supra note 9, at 194-97. Western states used bilateral most-favored-nation
clauses, but the regime in China established a new multilateral form. See generally Chester
Lloyd Jones, The American Interpretation of the "Most Favored Nation" Clause, 32 ANNALS
Am. AcAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 119-29 (1908).
28 See BARBARA J. BROOKS, JAPAN'S IMPERIAL DIPLOMACY 79 (2000) (indicating the
Japanese were forced to adhere to the treaty port system rules in China); FREDERIC WAKEMAN,
JR., THE FALL OF IMPERIAL CHINA 137-39 (1975). See generally PETER WESLEY-SMrrH,
UNEQUAL TREATY 1898-1997 (rev. ed. 1998).
29 Although individual ports may have been nominated by treaty as ports for exchange in
treaties by and among Western powers, no system of widespread, multilateral participation like
the one which developed in China had existed. See generally Andrew Caplin & Kala Krishna,
Tariffs and the Most-Favored Nation Clause: A Game Theoretic Approach, 1 SEOUL J. ECON.
267 (1988) (discussing effect of most-favored-nation on trade). Adoption in this context refers
to the alleged wholesale importation of Western law into a void in China. Adaptation refers to
Western use of existing ideas and institutions as the starting point and the process of changing
these institutions to meet Western needs.
30 See, e.g., Treaty of Wanghsia supra note 16.
3 Some go so far as to even characterize China as having no law or at least no private law,
most notably John King Fairbank. Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REv. 179,
181-83 & n. 18 (2002) (noting Fairbank, Jenner, and Barlow as among those prominent scholars).
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the rules and traditions of China are viewed as reflecting a single state's laws
and not a system of laws developed through competition among and discourse
between independent states.32 Nineteenth century states denied China's law
in order to justify its colonization.33 It is unclear why contemporary legal
scholars continue this practice. 4
Understanding the present Chinese attitude toward international law is
necessary in developing meaningful laws and achieving cooperation among
modem states.3 ' A firm understanding of ritual and the disparity between
official attitudes and practices in historical and modem China is crucial to the
meaningful development of modem international law, and the key to this
understanding lies in historical analysis. "Confucian scholar-officials . . . in
fact made regular use of the law, even as they denigrated it as an unworthy
instrument through which to discharge their responsibilities. 3 6 Both the
Chinese perspective and the Confucian context continue to inform modem
developments in international law.37
Although scholars note the existence of various aspects of international law
such as the protection of Overseas Chinese and Prince Gong's creation of the
Zongli Yamen in 1861,38 the study of international law in China during the
latter half of the nineteenth century requires deeper analysis.39 Legal scholars
hold that Qing China's hierarchical tributary system evidenced a lack of
international law in China,4" and that the creation of the treaty port system to
replace the tribute system marked the introduction of Western international
See also FAIRBANK, supra note 12, at 185-86.
3 LoRi F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW, at xxvii (4th ed., 2001).
3 Ruskola, supra note 3 1, at 183.
3 In studying the history of international law, definitions should be used to clarify and
explain rather than to exclude illuminating elements.
35 See generallyA Strong Chinese Economy Grounds China 'sAcceptance oflts Responsibil-
ities as a Member of the World Community, METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, Dec. 2004,
at 47, available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2004/December/47,48.pdf.
36 Alford, supra note 22, at 49.
37 Li, supra note 21, at 315.
38 See TENG & FAIRBANK, supra note 20, at 150.
39 See generally PAUL A. COHEN, DISCOvERING HISTORY IN CHINA: AMERICAN HISTORICAL
WRITING ON THE RECENT CHINESE PAST (1984); Alford, supra note 22. But see Edwards, supra
note 26, at 33 (illustrating "the dynamic process of interstate law-making in China's relations
with some of its East Asian neighbors in the later imperial era").
40 Confucianism (with its social hierarchy) dominated the development of Chinese legal
thought after 206 B.C. Wejen Chang, Foreword to THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA,
supra note 22, at vii, x. This system has been widely characterized as inconsistent with
contemporary international law and legal relationships.
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law. Just as recent scholarship has proven that civil law existed in Qing
China,4 a careful examination of China's international relations from 1839-
1895 demonstrates the existence of a Chinese system of international law.4"
Closer scrutiny reveals application of principles and concepts consistent with
contemporary Western international law and crucial to the development of
modern international law. The birth of modem international law involved the
clash of two universalistic systems: the European and the Chinese.
A. Meeting of Two Systems
Confucian ritual served as the means of negotiation between China and
foreign states. 3 Westerners also used ceremony and ritual as negotiation
techniques but denied the validity of China's ritual as such." The ritual itself
constituted communication between states and a foreign embassy could be
assessed through its ability or willingness to participate in court ritual, whether
in China or in England.45 Both the European and Chinese systems of thought
provided a universalistic explanation of the world and their own place within
it. Neither system allowed for the existence of a competing ideal and both
placed themselves in the single leadership position.
Confucianism views the family as the basic unit of society 6 and orders
relationships within the family by the status of the participants.47 By refusing
to participate in the Chinese tribute system or to acknowledge the emperor's
status, Westerners relegated themselves to the status of "uncivilized peoples"
in the Chinese models of positive and natural law. 8 China conceived itself as
"' See Kathryn Bernhardt & Philip C.C. Huang, Civil Law in Qing and Republican China:
The Issues, in CIVIL LAW IN Q1NG AND REPUBLICAN CHINA, 1, 2 (Kathryn Bernhardt & Philip
C.C. Huang eds., 1994); see also T'UNG-TSU CH'T, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA UNDER THE
CH'ING 118-19 (1969) (describing civil law administered locally by magistrates). See generally
PHILIP C.C. HUANG, CIVIL JUSTICE IN CHINA: REPRESENTATION AND PRACTICE IN THE QING
(1996). Note, however, that it was previously believed that during this period, China had only
criminal law, with little or no civil law. See generally id; TENG AND FAIRBANK, supra note 20,
at 185.
42 See Alford, supra note 22, at 49.
43 HEVIA, supra note 25, at 210-12.
" Id. at 212.
41 Id. at 210-14 (referencing reaction to British inability to understand Qing ritual).
4 Edwards, supra note 26, at 35.
4' See Yu-LAN FuNG & DERK BODDE, A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY 21-22
(1997).
48 In fact, the term "tributary state system" is a Western concept used to describe the
hierarchical Confucian relationship between China and those who acknowledged its hegemony
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the "Middle Kingdom" and the center of the world, bearing the burden of
leading civilized peoples and asserting dominion over uncivilized peoples.
Applied to the international arena, Confucian principles placed China in the
position of "head of the family." '4 9 The Chinese viewed the emperor as the
elder brother of other monarchs and leaders, and in this model equated states
with their rulers.5 °
Korea, Japan, and much of Asia embraced Confucianism5 and as a result,
Confucian relationships and ideals formed the basis of commonly held
metaphysical principles and customs. 5 2 "Korean kings, Annamese monarchs,
and Japanese emperors all ruled in their own right, but within the Confucian
hierarchy they were ranked as younger brothers of the Chinese emperor, who
was expected to ratify their investitures."53 Customary relationships among
societies and the agreements made between them form the basis of positive law
in Asia just as in Europe. In Asia, natural law, derived from metaphysical
principles, reflected the Confucian, Taoist, and Buddhist systems of thought
rather than Christian principles.5 4
Whereas Christianity united the major European states and philosophers
(even in protest), Confucian, Buddhist, and Taoist philosophers expounded the
principles upon which the Asian concept of natural law was based and carried
on their own heated debates.5 Just as Christianity spread across Europe,
Confucianism spread across Asia. Each heavily influenced the development
of regional legal systems through the spread of culture, custom, and social
norms. Both traditions created international law. In this case, scholars
misunderstand the effect of Confucian ritual on Chinese policy. This effect did
not significantly differ from contemporary Christian beliefs' effects on
European and American foreign policy.56 In no case did a state turn a blind eye
through the offer of tribute. It is used here and throughout because the essential point is not to
examine the system itself but Western denial of its validity and status.
49 See Jerome Alan Cohen, China andIntervention: Theory and Practice, 121 U. PA. L. REv.
471, 475 (1973) (noting that the idea of a family of nations was a Western concept).
50 DAMROSCH, supra note 32, at xxvii. In fact, one should place less importance on the
concept of states as geo-political entities than on the identity of the states' rulers.
"' JOHN M. STEADMAN, THE MYTH OFAsiA, 71-75 (1969) (discussing Asia's belief systems,
the adoption of Buddhism across East Asia, and its incorporation into existing, shared beliefs).
52 Not only did these beliefs center around the family, but they also focused on society as a
whole, not limited to a particular nation or people. Id. at 74-75.
s3 WAKEMAN, supra note 28, at 111.
54 Id. at 67-78.
" See FUNG & BODDE, supra note 47, at 20-22, 27-38, 65-80, 87-91, 99-104, 151-90.
56 See MAX WEBER, THE RELIGION OF CHINA 226-49 (Hans H. Gerth trans., 1951)
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to its own interests in favor of its traditional rhetoric. In China as in the West,
reference to traditional beliefs should be viewed as necessitated by state action
rather than the reverse.
The Confucian notion that the emperor of China is the elder brother of all
other rulers holds no less legitimacy as natural law than European notions of
law based upon Christian beliefs. Both evidence the influence of regional
metaphysical principles on the formation of regional custom. Thus, the
"Middle Kingdom" idea that China is the center of the civilized universe was
far from pure xenophobia or cultural hubris 5T-it was a universalistic view
similar to Manifest Destiny and other Western Christian ideals.5" China's legal
status among nations had been established through customary practices and
relationships-"the derivation of norms from basic metaphysical principles."59
A cursory comparison between European Christian beliefs and Chinese
Confucian beliefs reveals more similarities than differences. °
Europeans dealt differently with each other as civilized nations and with
others as uncivilized peoples, using a two-tiered system of foreign relations.
It is not surprising that nineteenth century Europeans had difficulty under-
standing Confucianism as applied to the international arena and considered
China among the uncivilized. "That the Chinese leaders had not compre-
hended in the 1870s that the tributary relationship had no status in Western
international law may seem incredible."61 Nor is it surprising that the Chinese
considered the Europeans uncivilized for their lack of understanding:
"[P]eoples who failed to observe the Confucian rites of monarchy were placed
much lower in the hierarchy, so that like a great ladder of being the entire
world order descended from higher civilization to the lower rungs of barba-
rism.""
(comparing Protestantism and Confucianism); cf FUNG & BODDE, supra note 47, at 147
(discussing traditional attitudes toward business and law in contrast with European attitudes and
the opposite effect of these attitudes on the development of capitalism in both societies).
" See Edwards, supra note 26, at 37-38.
s' See, e.g., HEVIA, supra note 25, at 210-15.
59 DAMROSCH, supra note 32, at xxxi (defining custom). See also Edwards, supra note 26,
at 34-35. "[These notions were fundamental in the evolution of what might be termed an
indigenous East Asian system of international law." Id.
' See, e.g., STEADMAN, supra note 51, at 69.
61 Edwin Pak-wah Leung, Li Hung-chang and the Liu-ch 'iu (Ryukyu) Controversy, 1871-
1881, in LI HUNG-CHANG AND CHINA'S EARLY MODERNIZATION 172 (Samuel C. Chu & Kwang-
Ching Liu eds., 1994).
62 WAKEMAN, supra note 28, at 111; see also Cohen, supra note 49, at 476.
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Nineteenth century Europeans denied Chinese ritual and discounted the
legal validity of the Chinese tribute system (as opposed to the treaty port
system). Their incentive to do so is abundantly clear. By denying the legal
status of the tributary state system, Western powers could ignore China's claim
of suzerainty over states in Asia and press their own imperialist claims.63
Since the Western powers competed among themselves, an outright denial of
the force of international law in Asia would detract from the defensibility of
their own claims as against each other.' In asserting their own legal claims
and denouncing the validity of Chinese legal claims, Western powers could
hope to seize by force and retain by law those rights and territories they desired
in Asia.65 Modern scholars must recognize this motivation and reconcile their
analysis of the tributary state system as an element of international law on its
own merits rather than employ this convenient tool of nineteenth century
European imperialism. 66
In studying China, scholars often resort to portraying traditional attitudes
and phrases as reasons behind policy decisions rather than as justifications of
those decisions. Scholars' fascination with the "Middle Kingdom" or "Central
Realm" idea remains the clearest example of this phenomenon. Scholars use
colorful terms such as "Middle Kingdom" and "Son of Heaven," rather than
more utilitarian terms such as "China," "emperor," or "ruler," to emphasize the
alien and antiquated attitudes of the Chinese in the nineteenth century.67
What remains somewhat surprising is that modern scholars sometimes
disregard the parallel between China's regard for the West and the West's
regard for China. According to Chinese thought, Westerners were
barbarians;68 according to Western thought, China was uncivilized. To the
Europeans, China represented the "Far East," whereas to the Chinese,
Westerners came from the "Far West." 69 Both societies had created formali-
ties, rituals, and rules reflecting a universalistic view. As these two systems
63 See BEASLEY, supra note 24, at 17-20.
64 See generally id.
65 See id.
66 See HEVIA, supra note 25, at 14, 18 (discussing the tribute system as an element of a
Chinese foreign policy focused on practical means of defense against foreign intrusion).
67 Cf. W. ScoTr MORTON, CHINA: ITS HISTORY AND CULTURE 143 (1 st ed. 1980) (discussing
early Jesuit translations and their effect on foreign attitudes).
68 Cf TENG & FAmrBANK, supra note 20, at 19-20 (detailing Qing law with regard to foreign
envoys and the inappropriateness of the British gifts in a 1793 response to a British request to
send a trade representative to Beijing).
69 FUNG & BODDE, supra note 47, at xvi-xvii, 319-42.
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combined, they competed to determine where the center of this new universe
would lie. Chinese adoption of Western forms of legal argument need not
imply wholesale adoption of Western international law; rather, it should be
seen as an effort to translate traditional Chinese ideas and institutions into
ideas Westerners might understand and even value. In China, the Western
powers faced a large, dense society removed from Europe spatially and
culturally-as a colonial enterprise, a logistical nightmare. In the West, China
faced a united coalition of well-armed, hostile aliens determined to exact trade
rights-as a defensive action, a losing proposition.7" In order to arrive at a
solution to their problems, the Chinese adopted Western language and
argument while the Westerners adapted existing Chinese institutions to fit their
needs.7"
B. Formation of a Single System
European international law became important to the Qing dynasty as Great
Britain, France, Russia, and the United States began to increase their
exploration and trade efforts in the East in the nineteenth century. Precisely
because China's armed forces proved ineffective against Western might,
diplomacy became China's last great hope for defending its hegemony and
maintaining its sovereignty in the face of increasing Western and, later,
Japanese aggression.72
The Opium War (1839-1842) marked the beginning of the demise of
traditional practices in China as British gunboats forced concessions from the
Qing government.7 3 These concessions led to the establishment of the treaty
port system and foreign spheres of influence in China.74 Prior to the signing
of the Treaty of Nanking ending the first Opium War in August 1842, the Qing
70 "The most immediate danger confronting the Chinese government during the crisis of
1859-61 was foreign aggression." ARTHUR F. WRIGHT, CONFUCIANISM AND CHINESE
CrVILIZATION 222 (1959).
" Rather than trying to create or impose an entirely novel system of governance, Westerners
used the existing forms of commerce China reserved for particularly determined invaders.
72 Li, supra note 21, at 317; see also Karen G. Turner, Introduction to THE LIMITS OF THE
RULE OF LAW IN CHINA, supra note 22, at 1, 11; BEASLEY, supra note 24, at 58-59 (noting that
the tone of discussions between Japanese and Li Hungchang indicated Western power
disapproval and not Chinese strength influenced Japan's negotiations following the Sino-
Japanese War of 1894-1895 and that the Liaotung Peninsula was removed from Japan's demands
at their insistence).
73 FAIRBANK, supra note 12, at 198-200.
74 See id.
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government maintained control over foreign trade through the cohong (or
Canton) system in Guangzhou wherein Chinese hong merchants acted as go-
betweens in the foreign trade.75
"But 1842 began a new era-the opening of China to Western commercial
exploitation."76 Both sides were forced to make accommodations in order to
work toward their separate goals" and the new system of rules and institutions
they created became what we now call international law. Traditional Chinese
practices and attitudes did not give way to purely Western ideas, but instead
to entirely new adaptations of both Western and Eastern laws and institutions,
which constituted a break from tradition for the Europeans and Chinese alike.
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, China found itself firmly lodged
between Western nations seeking concessions and trade rights on the one hand,
and the voracious Japanese on the other. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-
1895 resulted in a humiliating defeat for China.78 China lost its hold over
Korea but maintained its territorial integrity as a result of European interven-
tion (the Tripartite Intervention).79
Shortly after losing the Sino-Japanese war, China also lost its last major
tributary state, Korea.80 The last major distinguishing characteristic of China's
international legal system, the tributary state system, disappeared as an
institution." It appears to many modem scholars that at this point, "European
international law became international law without the qualification of
'European.' ,82
"' See generally id. Note that Guangzhou is the modem transliteration of the city name
Latinized in the nineteenth century as Canton.
76 FAIRBANK, supra note 9, at 3.
7' The Chinese had to placate the aggressive, militarily superior West and the West sought
to minimize the cost of administration through informal empire. See generally FAIRBANK, supra
note 12.
7' EDWiNO. REISCHAUER, THE UNITED STATES ANDJAPAN, at 19-22, 26-28, 112(1951). See
generally BEASLEY, supra note 24, at 55-68 (noting the remarkable ease and rapidity with which
Japan defeated China).
7' Also called the Triple Intervention. Germany, France, and Russia intervened to prevent
Japan from attaining a foothold on the mainland (the Liaotung Peninsula), but China ceded
Taiwan to Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. BEASLEY, supra note 24, at 57-59.
8o China lost Taiwan in 1895; Korea became a Japanese protectorate in 1905 and a colony
in 1910. BEASLEY, supra note 24, at 6.
" Onuma, supra note 19, at 44.
82 Id.
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Hence, the Chinese made serious efforts to bring international
law into full play in their struggle to shake off the yoke of the
unequal treaty regime [wherein China was forced to sign treaties
favorable to Western powers and non-reciprocal in nature] and to
create and maintain a strong and unified China, that is no longer
the 'central realm' based on Confucian culturalism but a nation
state-with a rightful place in the family of nations.8 3
This dividing line, whether seen as the point at which European interna-
tional law became the only international law or the point at which international
law became truly international, remains important to the study of the history
of international law as the point at which the European system and the Chinese
system merged to produce a single body of law used by both Eastern and
Western states. 84 Going forward, Japan used international law in its expan-
sionist efforts, China used international law in its struggle for survival, and the
West was forced to accept Asian states into its ranks and to apply international
law to its own relations with non-European states.8 5
III. ANALYSIS: ADOPTION VERSUS ADAPTATION
A. Chinese Adoption of Western Legal Language and Argument
China's system of international law incorporated specific territorial
boundaries and explicitly addressed issues of sovereignty in the definition of
interstate relationships through both treaty and custom. 6 Nineteenth century
China expended a great deal of effort in maintaining its territorial sovereignty.
When Western gunboat diplomacy made a military defense clearly impractical,
China turned to diplomacy in hopes of maintaining its sovereignty. This
diplomacy involved the invocation of principles of fairness and reciprocity
common to both the European and Chinese systems of international law, but
was expressed in Western legal terms since China petitioned in the face of
Western military might.
83 Li, supra note 21, at 317. Regarding unequal treaties, see BEASLEY, supra note 24, at 14-
23. See Onuma, supra note 19.
s See generally BEASLEY, supra note 24.
86 See generally Edwards, supra note 26, at 33.
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China asserted its own territorial sovereignty through protests to Western
incursions on its possessions.87 A 1793 response to British requests for the
cession of trade rights specifically states that "[e]very foot of land in the
Celestial Empire belongs to a territorial district with precisely demarcated
boundaries."88 Qing control over its own territory and populace required clear
definition of and control over the boundaries between China and foreign states.
Chinese reliance on these boundaries demonstrates a respect for the legality of
established geographic and political boundaries-at least in times of peace.89
In the mid-1870s China's Sinkiang region was in the hands of Moslem
rebels.9" Chinese officials feared that the Sinkiang rebellion might spread from
Outer to Inner Mongolia and threaten Beijing. Priority was given to attempts
to bring Sinkiang under control and the majority of state revenues during the
latter half of the 1870s went toward the effort.9 China restored control over
Sinkiang in 1878 but the Ili Valley remained under Russian control until
1881.92 The efforts of the Zongli Yamen and Qing diplomats in Europe were
rewarded by the return of Ili by the Treaty of St. Petersburg of 1881 .9 This is
viewed as a major diplomatic victory and a successful employment of
contemporary (Western) international law by the Qing government but was in
fact the employment of traditional Chinese strategy expressed through Western
legal language.
The Ili valley in Sinkiang 94 was a strategic point of contention between
Russia and China.95 As a peaceful settlement with the Russians appeared near
I ld. at 36 (citing protests to British intrusion in Macao).
88 Id. at 37 (quoting 23 YUE HAIGUAN ZHI [GAZETTEER OF GUANGDONG MARITIME
CUSTOMS] (photo reprint) I Oa-b (1968)).
89 See Edwards, supra note 26, at 37. Of course this is not to say that China did not engage
in conquest, but that during times of peace, boundaries and demarcations were respected. Note
nineteenth century Western concepts of a law of war and a law of peace.
90 FAIRBANK, supra note 12, at 151.
91 ld.
92 id. at 154.
91 JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 220-21 (1990). The diplomats
were Marquis Zeng, minister to Britain and his successor, Hsieh Fucheng, Ambassador to
England, France, and Italy. See TIE EUROPEAN DIARY OF HSIEH FUCHENG, supra note 1, at 49-
51.
9' For general information on the importance of Ili to Qing Inner Asia, see SPENCE, supra
note 93, at 97.
" Key-Hiuk Kim, The Aims ofLi Hung-chang's Policies Toward Japan and Korea, 1870-
1882, in LI HUNG-CHANG AND CHINmA'S EARLY MODERNIZATION 145, 151 (Samuel C. Chu &
Kwang-Ching Liu eds., 1994).
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in 1880, Li Hung-chang96 advocated establishing a relationship with the
Russians as part of his strategy to manage foreign state relations by encourag-
ing competition among the foreign states.97 In 1894, Hsieh Fucheng9t noted
ongoing negotiations with the Russians over border disputes and the threat
communicated through Britain that Russia would resort to the use of force if
negotiations failed.99 China played upon the rivalry between Britain and
Russia to regain control over the Ili Valley through legal argument and treaty
negotiations.'00
This was not the employment of Western balance-of-power strategy but the
use of a traditional Chinese barbarian management technique-just as the
tribute, cohong, and treaty port systems represented institutionalization of
traditional barbarian management techniques. China's use of Western legal
arguments must be seen for what it was: the employment of diplomacy as an
alternative to a military solution. Just as the Chinese learned the language of
the foreigners to better communicate, they also employed terminology familiar
to the barbarians.
B. Western Adaptation of Chinese Legal Forms and Institutions
The clearest example of Western adaptation of Chinese legal forms and
institutions remains the creation of a multilateral treaty port system with rights
of extraterritoriality and the most-favored-nation clause. None of these
institutions and customs were new by themselves but the resulting regime
represented a significant diversion from the past practices of both East and
West. As an emerging power seeking equal status with the West, Japan gained
most-favored-nation status with China formally through the Treaty of
Shimonoseki in 1895. But China had been "expanding the advantages offered
to Japan under international law" even earlier through the efforts of its Foreign
Ministry.' Recognizing the dangers ofmost-favored-nation clauses, Li Hung-
chang avoided such provisions in earlier negotiations with the Japanese over
96 Li Hung-chang was a senior Chinese official and a major figure in formation and
implementation of Chinese foreign policy. See generally id.
9 Leung, supra note 61, at 168-70.
9' Hsieh Fucheng was Ambassador to England, France, and Italy during the 1890s. See THE
EUROPEAN DIARY OF HSIEH FUCHENG, supra note 1, at 19.
9 Id. at 195-96.
'o See Kim, supra note 95, at 152-54.
'o' See BROOKS, supra note 28, at 80.
[Vol. 33:685
CHINESE ADOPTION AND WESTERN ADAPTATION
Korea. 10 2 With the inclusion of Japan among the Western powers (primarily
England, France, the United States, and Russia) who negotiated concessions
as a result of the Opium Wars, China faced a serious problem.
As the Qing government feared, foreign trade increased illegal activity
among Chinese pirates along the coast and their associated secret societies.
The words of Hsieh Fucheng, Ambassador to England, France, and Italy during
the 1890s summarize the Chinese concerns:
Hong Kong has become a haven for criminals from both
Fujian and Guangdong provinces as the local Chinese officials
lack the jurisdiction to arrest them. Several of my predecessors
have fought vigorously for our right to install a consulate there,
but to no avail. I must keep this in mind and strive again at the
appropriate time for our legal rights as a nation.103
Extraterritoriality and consular relations were not traditionally goals of
Chinese foreign policy or elements of Chinese international law. China
traditionally used a tribute system to establish relations with territories beyond
practical reach and subjugated others."4 As China applied traditional notions
of reciprocity to the actions of the Western aggressors, however, establishment
of foreign consulates became a goal.
As foreign pressure increased, the Qing dynasty attempted to accommodate
trade while containing its influence. In 1759 Guangzhou (Canton) was made
the official port for trade with foreigners through Chinese brokers (the cohong
system). °5 In 1793 a British mission visited Beijing bearing examples of
manufacturing technology and requesting greater trade rights for British
merchants. 6 The Qing government refused both the requests of 1793 and a
similar mission in 1816; the government's chief concern was to concentrate on
preserving its authority within China and its control over tributary states.'
0 7
China's hegemony in the nineteenth century included important inner-Asian
possessions and tributary states. Chinese Turkestan was invaded by inner-
Asian Moslems from Kokand in 1826. Although order was restored by Qing
102 Kim, supra note 95, at 154-55.
103 THE EUROPEAN DIARY OF HSIEH FUCHENG, supra note 1, at 4 (recording a journal entry
from January 14, 1890).
"' One example of this is Kashgar and Kodor. See Edwards, supra note 26, at 33.
105 FAIRBANK, supra note 12, at 195.
106 Id. at 196-97.
107 Id.
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reinforcements in 1827, concessions were made to neighboring Kokand, a
tributary state.
[Qing officials established] "an administrative settlement
which by 1835 provided that (1) Kokand should station a
political representative at Kashgar with commercial agents under
him at five other cities; (2) these officials should have consular,
judicial, and police powers over foreigners in the area (most of
whom came from Kokand); and (3) they could levy customs
duties on the goods of such foreigners."'' 8
Rather than characterize the Turkestan settlement as a treaty, John King
Fairbank characterized it as "an exercise in barbarian management."'
0 9
Phrased in Western terms, however, the Turkestan settlement created a treaty
port.10 The Turkestan settlement demonstrates the transformation of a
tributary state relationship to a treaty port relationship, all without the
involvement of European legal minds.
Western powers dealt with their colonies and each other in entirely
different fashions. Ignoring or refusing the requests of petty states regarding
the conduct of colonization could fairly be said to have been the West's own
policy. Ideologically, Chinese treatment of foreign powers centered on a
commitment to the superiority of the Emperor among leaders of the world, as
well as the superiority of China among nations.' Functionally, Chinese
treatment of foreign powers reveals a system of laws designed to promote
internal stability and prosperity through a variety of tactics and institutions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Qing China faced serious internal challenges to its authority, such as the
Taiping Rebellion, as well as confrontation on its borders both in the West in
Inner Asia and on its eastern coasts." 2 In the late eighteenth century even the
recently established United States traded with China," 3 but the loss of the
108 FAIRBANK, supra note 12, at 198. Note that Kashgar was located in Chinese Turkestan.
'09 Id. at 198.
"0 See JOANNA WALEY-COHEN, THE SEXTANTS OF BEING 7 (1999).
. Cf.Edwards, supra note 26, at 37-38.
112 TENG & FAIRBANK, supra note 20, at 191-98.
"' THE FEDERALIST NO. 4 (John Jay)("In the trade to China and India, we interfere with more
than one nation, inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages which they had in a manner
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Opium Wars and imposition of the treaty port system in 1842 forced a
reevaluation of foreign relations and a transformation of the process for
dealing with Western states and their trade." 4 Instead of relegating the
barbarians to trade at a single point during specific trading seasons, the Qing
government was forced to negotiate a settlement similar to its earlier treaty
with Kokand. The Western powers then adapted the Chinese treaty port to
their own purposes through a series of treaty re-negotiations that created the
treaty port system. The creation of the treaty port system reflected the Western
adaptation of existing Chinese international law and diplomacy.
The treaty port system began as a Chinese institution but evolved through
treaty negotiation into an entirely new legal structure comprising extraterritori-
ality, most-favored-nation clauses, spheres of influence, and other aspects of
modem international law. Although the Western states had made use of treaty
ports in other imperialist efforts, the evolution of the treaty port system in
China created a cooperative, governing institution: one of the first legal forms
of the new, global international law.
As the West sought to force open trade with China in the mid-nineteenth
century, two systems of foreign relations law came into conflict: the European
system and the Chinese system. These two regional systems allowed no
accommodation for competing systems and were forced to merge as neither
could subsume the other: China faced a militarily superior West and the West
faced a daunting economic and technological challenge in administering an
empire at such a remote distance, over such a large civilization. The single
system of international law resulting from the merger of these two systems
involved Western adaptation of existing Chinese institutions and Chinese
adoption of Western legal language and argument. The treaty port system
grew out of the merger of these two systems and with its most-favored-nation
clause and multilateral nature, constitutes a cooperative, governing legal
institution characteristic of modem international law.
monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves with commodities which we used to purchase
from them.").
114 The Treaty of Nanking ended the Opium War and China's cohong system, opening ports
to trade and creating the treaty port system. See Treaty of Nanking, supra note 2. "[T]he
Emperor of China agrees to... permit them [British merchants] to carry on their mercantile
transactions with whatever persons they please." Id., 93 Consol. T.S. at 467.
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